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SINKING THE UNPAID EXTERNSHIP: HOW MANY UNPAID EXTERNSHIPS VIOLATE THE FAIR LABOR 






In recent decades, unpaid internships and externships–internships administered by 
university programs through which interns can earn school credit–have become an increasingly 
ubiquitous part of American university education, particularly for graduate students in law school 
and business school. At some law schools, participation in an externship program has become a 
de facto graduation requirement. Proponents of such programs tout them as a novel, highly useful 
form of experiential learning that fills in the gaps left by traditional classroom education.
2
 To 
those proponents, unpaid internships and externships are a critical tool for on-the-job training, and 
they provide both necessary experience and an opportunity for students to demonstrate their skills 
to prospective employers. However, critics of unpaid internships and externship programs 
question the actual educational value of unpaid labor and view with skepticism the considerable 
cost savings that such programs generate both for universities and for sponsoring employers. 
The legality–and morality–of certain unpaid internships and university externship 
programs is highly questionable, and the practice has begun to generate a substantial amount of 
                                                          
1
 J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 2013; B.A., The Colorado College, 2009. I wish to express my 
heartfelt gratitude to Professor Scott Moss at the University of Colorado Law School for his insights and for his 
ongoing encouragement and support. This Article is dedicated to all workers who do not receive a fair wage for 
their work. All mistakes are the author’s alone. 
2
 See generally, e.g., James H. Blackman, Practical Examples for Establishing an Externship Program Available to 
Every Student, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2007); Michael A. Yarnell, An Externship Program: Start It, Grow It, Improve It, 3 
PHOENIX L. REV. 473 (2010). 
2 
 





 alleging that the companies violated the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act by illegally employing unpaid interns. Beyond these 
recent lawsuits, unpaid internships for private-sector employers are a widespread, controversial 
practice whose legality is at best unclear. 
This Article argues that unpaid internships and externships for private-sector employers 
are illegal because they violate the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938. More specifically, private-sector unpaid interns and externs are entitled to be paid a 
minimum wage because they are statutory employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and all 
employees are entitled to a minimum wage under the Act by default. This Article argues the 
additional points, which to date have not been argued elsewhere, that (1) universities that place 
externs in illegal unpaid externships are jointly liable for unpaid wages, and (2) many individuals, 
including university administrators and externship supervisors, are individually liable for the 
unpaid minimum wages of student workers in their externship programs. 
Part I describes the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
and explains why many unpaid interns and externs for private-sector entities qualify as covered 
“employees” under the Act. Part I also both explains the Act’s legal mechanisms for paying full-
time students less than the minimum wage and identifies some circumstances under which unpaid 
private-sector internships and externships do not violate the law. 
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 Wang v. Hearst Corp., 1:12-cv-00793 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Jan. 31, 2012). See also Outten & Golden LLP, Hearst 
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(last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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Part II explains that the scope of FLSA liability for the unpaid minimum wages of private-
sector unpaid interns and externs is extraordinarily broad. Other scholarship and lawsuits have 
argued that the employers of unpaid interns and externs are FLSA-liable; Part II contributes the 
following two previously ignored FLSA liabilities. First, universities that place externs in illegal 
unpaid externships may be jointly liable for unpaid wages both as joint employers and as third-
party employers who directly cause violations of the Act. Second, individual university 
administrators may be individually liable for the unpaid minimum wages of externs who 
participate in the university externship programs that they oversee. Given that FLSA liability can 
reach into academia, schools sponsoring unpaid externships may ultimately receive less of a 
bargain than they had assumed. 
I.  MANY UNPAID EXTERNSHIPS VIOLATE THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
  The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
5
 (“the FLSA” or “the Act”) comprehensively 
regulates the wages of employees to whom the Act applies.
6
 Originally intended to alleviate 
oppressive working conditions,
7
 the New Deal-Era statute imposes a number of requirements 
upon employers, including the requirement that many employees be paid “time-and-a-half” 
                                                          
5
 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–219 (West 2012). 
6
 The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements apply only to employees “in industries engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” id. § 202(a), and only to employers with gross sales or 
revenue of at least $500,000, id. § 203(s)(1). Most businesses qualify: the United States Supreme Court currently 
employs a broad interpretation of “engaged in commerce”; and even most small businesses have revenue (not 
profits) in a gross (not net) volume above $500,000 (e.g., a solo-practice lawyer would have to bill barely 1500 
hours at $350 hourly to exceed that threshold, and almost any small store netting just $100,000 in income almost 
surely generated over $500,000 gross revenue because profit margins above 20% are not common). Accordingly, 
the remainder of this Article assumes that the employers discussed herein are among the vast majority deemed to 
be “engaged in commerce.”  
7
 Id. § 202. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-260 (Sept. 26, 1989), 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 696–97 (recounting President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s May 24, 1937, statement to Congress regarding the nascent FLSA that “[a] self-supporting and self-
respecting democracy can plead no justification for the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling 
workers' wages or stretching workers' hours,” and that “[a]ll but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to 
conserve our primary resources of manpower, Government must have some control over maximum hours, 
minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the exploitation of unorganized labor”) 
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overtime wages for any hours over forty worked in one week,
8
 restrictions upon the employment 
of children,
9
 and a minimum hourly wage.
10
 This Part first describes which workers are covered 
as “employees” under the FLSA. Second, this Part explains the mechanism by which employers 
may legally pay students less than minimum wage. Third, this Part explains the narrow 
exemptions from the Act’s protections for volunteer work, vocational training, and bona fide 
educational externships that do not substantially benefit the employer. Finally, this Part argues 
that the vast majority of externships at private-sector employers fail to fall within any of the 
FLSA’s narrow exemptions, and therefore violate the Act’s minimum wage protections by 
illegally taking advantage of unpaid labor. 
A. Who is an Employee under the FLSA? 
Because the FLSA aims to correct oppressive working conditions, its coverage is 
extraordinarily broad, and the terms “employ,” “employee,” and “employer” as defined under the 
Act encompass a significantly larger swath of working relationships than the traditional common 
law definitions of the terms do. Under the FLSA, “employee” is defined somewhat circularly as 
“any individual employed by an employer,”
11
 but “employ” is defined simply, and notably 
broadly, as “to suffer or permit to work.”
12
 Furthermore, under the FLSA, “‘employer’ includes 
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.”
13
 The FLSA’s purposefully broad and general definitions of these terms converge to 
give the Act’s protections an extraordinarily large scope. 




 Id. § 212. 
10
 Id. § 206(a). 
11
 Id. § 203(e)(1). 
12
 Id. § 203(g). 
13
 Id. § 203(d) (emphasis added). 
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The exceptionally expansive scope of the employer-employee relationship under the 
FLSA has been repeatedly recognized both by the United States Supreme Court and by numerous 
Courts of Appeals. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the Supreme Court contrasted 
the definition of “employee” under the FLSA with definitions of the term under other statutes, 
such as ERISA, the National Labor Relations Act (“the NLRA”), and the Social Security Act 
(“the SSA”), noting the comparatively “striking breadth” of the term under the FLSA.
14
 In that 
case, the Court also noted that the FLSA, “whose striking breadth we have previously noted, 
stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a 
strict application of traditional agency law principles.”
15
 Additionally, Courts of Appeals, 
acknowledging the Supreme Court’s emphatically broad interpretation of the FLSA’s definitions, 
consistently interpret the terms of the Act expansively in accordance with the “remedial nature of 
the statute[, which] warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions so that they will have 
‘the widest possible impact in the national economy.’”
16
 Because courts interpret the definitions 
of “employer,” “employee,” and “employ” broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act, 
the scope of the employer-employee relationship is uniquely expansive in the FLSA context and 
is not constrained by traditional common-law agency definitions of the terms. 
Just as employee status under the FLSA is not constrained by traditional common-law 
definitions of the terms, neither is it limited by contractual terminology designed to bring a 
particular relationship outside the scope of the Act’s minimum wage protections. In fact, rather 
                                                          
14
 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–26 (1992) 
15
 Id. at 325 (internal citation omitted). Such agency principles, which govern the scope of the employment 
relationship under other statutes, are significantly narrower. However, the remainder of this Article discusses the 
terms “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” only as defined under the FLSA. 
16
 Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Comm. Coll., 735 
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)).  See also Wallington v. Rutherford Food. Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946) (“[T]he 
definitive provisions of the [FLSA] are extremely comprehensive in their sweep.”) (emphasis added); Zheng v. 
Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This is ‘the broadest definition of “employ” that has even been 
included in any one act.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945)) (other citations and 
alterations omitted).  
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than rely upon common law definitions of control or upon the terms of a contract to determine 
whether an individual is an employee under the FLSA, courts employ an “economic reality” test, 
which examines the actual working relationship between the parties. In NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications, the Supreme Court first adopted the economic reality test to determine employee 
status under the NLRA, simultaneously rejecting the “right to control” test that separated 
employees from independent contractors at common law.
17
 The Court reasoned that because the 
NLRA was designed to alleviate industrial strife and inequality of bargaining power in labor 
relations, employee status should be evaluated with a view toward the statute’s purposes, and 
concluded that a relationship should come under the statute’s protections when “the economic 
facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than of independent business 
enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation.”
18
 
Shortly thereafter, in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
19
 the Court first applied the 
economic reality test in the FLSA context, outright rejecting the same common-law right-to-
control test rejected in the NLRA context three years earlier in Hearst Publications. Rutherford 
Food Corp. concerned a group of “beef boners”
20
 who worked at a cattle slaughterhouse.
21
 
Because the employer slaughterhouse had contractually labeled the beef boners as independent 
contractors, who are exempt from the FLSA’s protections, most of the boners worked well over 
the maximum hours prescribed by the FLSA for a standard workweek without overtime pay.
22
 
Moreover, the employer did not maintain records of the hours worked by the boners.
23
 In response, 
                                                          
17
 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 126–29 (1944) [hereinafter Hearst Publications]. 
18
 Id. at 128. 
19
 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–31 (1947) [hereinafter Rutherford Food Corp.]. 
20
 A “beef boner” is a specialized type of butcher who removes the bones from cattle carcasses during the 









the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (“the Division”) 
brought an action to enjoin the employer slaughterhouse’s continued violations of the FLSA, 
arguing that the beef boners had been improperly classified as independent contractors when they 
were, in fact, employees.
24
 The district court held that the beef boners were not employees of the 
slaughterhouse,
25
 but the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the beef boners were employees, in 
part because the shop steward heavily supervised their work and the slaughterhouse provided their 
uniforms and tools.
26
 The Circuit reasoned that “in doubtful situations, coverage is to be 
determined broadly by reference to the underlying economic realities rather than by traditional 
rules governing legal classifications of . . . employer and independent contractor.”
27
 The Supreme 




The Supreme Court further explained the economic reality test’s factors in a companion 
case, United States v. Silk, which concerned whether coal workers were employees under the 
Social Security Act.
29
 Silk found that the workers were employees, rather than independent 
contractors,
30
 and considered the following factors relevant to a determination of employee status 
under the economic reality test: (1) the degree of control exercised over the worker’s actions by 
the employer, (2) the relative investment in facilities by the worker and the employer, (3) the 
relative opportunity for profit and loss between the two, (4) the permanency of the relationship, 
                                                          
24
 Id. at 514, 516. 
25
 Id. at 516. 
26
 Id. at 515–16. 
27
 Id. at 516. 
28
 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. at 730–31. The Court also added, unequivocally, that “[the FLSA] 
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons and working 
relationships which, prior to this Act, were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.” Id. at 728–
29. 
29
 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 705–06 (1947). 
30
 Id. at 716–17. 
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and (5) the skill required to perform the worker’s job.
31
 Some other courts have also considered 




The economic reality test is the established way to determine “employee” status under the 
Act. The next Section discusses the relevant law with respect to employee status and exemptions 
from the minimum wage requirement for full-time students, vocational trainees, volunteers, and 
unpaid interns and externs. 
B. Many Unpaid Internships and Externships for Private Employers Violate the FLSA 
The preceding Section established that employee status under the FLSA is determined 
neither by traditional common-law definitions nor by contractual terminology or the 
characterizations of the parties. Rather, employee status under the FLSA and the applicability of 
its minimum wage protections depend on the economic reality of the relationship between the 
parties. By default, every statutory employee is entitled to be paid minimum wage under the Act, 
subject to some per se exemptions inapplicable here.
33
 However, Department of Labor guidelines 
and Supreme Court decisions interpreting the scope of the FLSA’s protections have made 
exceptions to the FLSA’s blanket minimum wage guarantee for volunteers, vocational trainees, 
some interns and externs who work in a bona fide educational environment and do not 
substantially benefit their employers, and full-time student labor. This Section first briefly 
                                                          
31
 Id. at 716. 
32
 See, e.g., Baystate v. Alternative Staffing, Inc., 163 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1998); Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., 757 
F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); Secretary v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied sub nom. Lauritzen v. McLauthlin, 488 U.S. 898 (1987); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989); 
Freund v. Hi-Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 F. App’x. 782 (11th Cir. 2006). 
33
 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)–(g).  For a non-exhaustive list of occupations exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage 
protections in more easily digestible form, see Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen75.asp (last visited November 20, 2012). Despite the odd specificity of 
some of the occupational exemptions, like wreathmakers, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(d), babysitters, id. § 213(a)(15), and 
computer programmers, id. § 213(a)(17), interns or those otherwise working either primarily or incidentally for 
educational benefit are not exempted altogether, and almost none would fall within the jobs or industries 
exempted by the Act. 
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explains the exclusive mechanism by which the wages of full-time student employees may 
lawfully fall below the standard minimum wage. Second, this Section explains the Supreme 
Court’s exemption from the FLSA for volunteer labor and vocational trainees, and argues that 
unpaid externs are neither. Third, this Section explains the narrow range of circumstances under 
which unpaid internships may be lawfully exempted from the FLSA’s minimum wages 
guarantees.  Finally, this Section argues that unpaid internships and externships for private-sector 
employers do not fit within any of the FLSA’s exemptions and thus violate its minimum wage 
provisions. 
1. Statutory Mechanism for Lower Minimum Wage for Full-time Students 
The FLSA provides a statutory mechanism by which employers may reduce a full-time 
student’s wages below the standard minimum wage:
34
 29 U.S.C. § 214(b) allows employers to 
reduce the wages of full-time students in certain industries to 85% of the minimum wage.
35
 The 
covered industries able to use this provision are narrow: retail or service establishments; 
agriculture; or institutions of higher learning where the students are enrolled.
36
 Further, before 
employing any full-time students at subminimum wages, an employer must apply to the 
appropriate regional administrator of the Division for a certificate authorizing the employer to pay 
subminimum wages.
37
 Section 214’s subminimum wage reduction mechanism thus is rarely 
applicable. It is relevant to this Article’s argument only insofar as its very existence illustrates that 
                                                          
34
 29 U.S.C. § 214. 
35
 Id. § 214(b). The section actually allows employers to reduce the minimum wage to the greater of either (1) 
$1.60 per hour or (2) 85% of the current general minimum wage. Id. The current federal minimum wage as of 
publication is $7.25 per hour, 85% of which will always be greater than $1.60 per hour.  See Minimum Wage, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm#.ULPvoYc818E (last visited November 26, 
2012). 
36
 Specifically, section 214(b) allows for the reduction of wages of a full-time student employed by a retail or 
service establishment, id. § 214(b)(1)(A), engaged in agriculture, id. § 214(b)(2), or employed by an institution of 
higher learning where the student is enrolled, id. § 214(b)(3). 
37
 29 C.F.R. § 519.3(a). See also id. § 519.4(a)(2) (an application for a certificate to pay subminimum wages to full-
time students must be submitted “not later than the start of such employment”); id. § 519.6(a) (certificates will 
not be issued retroactively). 
10 
 
failure to pay full-time student employees any wage at all is clearly a violation of the FLSA’s 
minimum wage provisions. Because the section allows employers to reduce the minimum wages 
of their full-time student employees to 85% of the minimum wage at the least, it is axiomatic that 
there is no plenary “student” exception that allows an employer to reduce a student worker’s 
wages to zero. 
2. Volunteer Labor and Vocational Training Are Exempted from the 
FLSA’s Minimum Wage Guarantees 
Although the definition of “employee” under the FLSA is extraordinarily broad, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that certain categories of working relationships do not fall 
within the employer-employee category, and therefore are not subject to the Act’s minimum wage 
guarantees. The primary exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court are (1) “those who, without 
any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the 
premises of another,”
38
 also known as vocational trainees, and (2) volunteers. This Section 
describes the two seminal Supreme Court cases that limited the scope of the FLSA’s uniquely 
expansive definition of “employ” to exclude those who use an employer’s resources strictly for 
their own benefit and volunteers, Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.
39
 and Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,
40
 respectively. 
In Portland Terminal Co., the Supreme Court reined in the FLSA’s uniquely expansive 
definition of “employee” by clarifying that it “was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as 
employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their 
own advantage on the premises of another.”
41
 The case was a challenge to a railroad’s practice of 
                                                          
38
 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) [hereinafter Portland Terminal Co.]. 
39
 Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 148. 
40
 Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
41
 Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 152. 
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offering unpaid “practical training to prospective yard brakemen” that lasted seven or eight 
days.
42
 The railroad hired its brakemen only from a list it maintained of qualified workers, and 
successful completion of the training program was a prerequisite to being included on the list.
43
 
After successful completion of the program, each brakeman was given a retroactive daily 
allowance of four dollars.
44
 The Division brought suit against the railroad company, arguing that 
the railroad company’s practice violated the Act’s minimum wage provisions.
45
 
The Supreme Court held that the practice did not violate the Act, and found especially 
dispositive that the each worker’s “activities do not displace any of the regular employees, who 
do most of the work themselves, and must stand immediately by to supervise whatever the 
trainees do. The applicant's work does not expedite the company business, but may, and 
sometimes does, actually impede and retard it.”
46
 The Court especially focused on the fact that the 
employer received no immediate and material advantage from the work performed by the trainees, 
contrasting the practice with a hypothetical situation where “an employer has evasively accepted 
the services of beginners at pay less than the legal minimum without having obtained permits 
from the administrator.”
47
 As discussed in Part II.B.3, infra, the Court’s reasoning for exempting 
the railroad company’s training program in Portland Terminal Co. underlies the Department of 
Labor’s entire policy about the applicability of the FLSA to unpaid interns and externs. 
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Court acknowledged an 
exemption from the FLSA for bona fide volunteers.
48
 The Division had brought suit against a 
                                                          
42
 Id. at 149. 
43




 Id. at 149. 
46
 Id. at 149–50.  
47
Id. at 153. 
48




private nonprofit religious organization for the unpaid minimum wages of the organization’s 
“associates.”
49
 The organization ran several commercial businesses to finance its nonprofit 
religious operations, and the associates were rehabilitated “drug addicts, derelicts, [and] criminals” 
who worked for the organization’s commercial businesses in exchange for food, shelter, clothing, 
and other benefits,
50
 but no wages.
51
 Notably, despite the protestations of the associates that they 
were not employees and did not expect to be paid, the Supreme Court held that they were 
statutory employees and therefore that the organization had violated the Act by failing to pay 
them a minimum wage.
52
 
In holding that the associates were employees under the Act, the Court emphasized the 
economic reality test that it first applied in the FLSA context in Rutherford Food Corp.,
5354
 and 
distinguished the associates from the brakemen in Portland Terminal Co., noting that the 
associates were financially dependent on the organization for long periods of time, up to several 
years.
55
 The Court held that a compensation agreement can be implied-in-fact and need not be 
explicit or even acknowledged by the employee.
56
 In applying the economic reality test to find 
that the associates were statutory employees, the Court insisted that a worker’s protestation that 
she is not actually an employee entitled to minimum wages is entirely irrelevant, stating that “the 
purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections.”
57
 
The Court further explained that to allow the Foundation to employ its associates at substandard 
                                                          
49
 Id. at 292–93. 
50




 Id. at 300–02. The Court also pointed out that the Act does not demand payment of wages in cash and that in-
kind wages may satisfy its requirement of payment of a minimum wage to employees. Id. 
53
 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947). 
54
 Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House 




 Id. at 301 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)). 
57
 Id. at 302. 
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wages would give it an unfair commercial advantage that the FLSA was intended to prevent.
58
 
However, the Court expressly noted that bona fide volunteers are not employees under the Act,
59
 
and it distinguished such actual volunteers from those who work voluntarily in otherwise 
nonexempt positions for substandard pay in violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage protections. 
Portland Terminal Co. and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation are the seminal decisions 
that define the rough boundary among “those who, without any express or implied compensation 
agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another,”
60
 bona fide 
volunteers, and implied-in-fact employees who claim that they are volunteers but are actually 
entitled to minimum wages under the Act. This Article argues that unpaid interns and externs who 
work at private-sector businesses fall into the latter category, and are covered employees who are 
entitled to be paid minimum wage despite their protestations to the contrary. The following 
Section describes the Department of Labor’s advisory publications that attempt to clarify the 
employee status of unpaid interns and externs under the FLSA. 
3. Unpaid Internships and Externships Do Not Violate the FLSA Under 
Certain Circumstances 
Following the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that exempts both “those who, without any 
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises 
of another” and bona fide volunteers from the FLSA’s minimum wage guarantees, the Wage and 
Hour Division has recently distributed some advisory publications that clarify the employee status 
                                                          
58
 Id. at 298–99. 
59
 “[There is no] reason to fear that, as petitioners assert, coverage of the Foundation's business activities will lead 
to coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help remodel a church home 
for the needy. The Act reaches only the ‘ordinary commercial activities’ of [exempt nonprofit] organizations, and 
only those who engage in those activities in expectation of compensation. Ordinary volunteerism is not threatened 
by this interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 302–03 (internal citations omitted). 
60
 Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 152. 
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of unpaid interns and externs under the FLSA.
61
 Although the Division’s advisory opinions and 
fact sheets do not carry the full force of law of administrative regulations,
62
 they provide useful 
guidance about the applicability of the FLSA’s minimum wage guarantees both to unpaid interns 
and participants in university externship programs. Moreover, the Department of Labor considers 
its opinion letters to be binding rulings,
63
 and the Supreme Court has deferred to the Department 
of Labor’s interpretations of both the FLSA and the Department’s own regulations.
64
  
In a 2006 opinion letter sent to a redacted party, the Wage and Hour Division responded to 
a query whether participants in a university externship program were employees under the 
FLSA.
65
 The program was organized as follows: 
[T]he students spend one week “shadowing” an employee at a sponsoring employer. The students 
are not compensated for time spent at the sponsoring employer, nor do they receive college credit 
for their time. The purpose of the program is purely educational, and the sponsors invest 
significant effort into designing experiences for the externs. The students do not generally perform 
work for the employers, but may perform small office tasks or assist with a project. Because of the 
short duration of the program, the sponsors do not derive any benefit from the externs’ labor, and 
the externs do not displace any regular employees. . . . [T]he only benefit to the sponsor, aside 
                                                          
61
 See, e.g., Wage and Hour Opinion Letter # FLSA2006-12, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Standards Admin., Wage and 
Hour Div. (April 6, 2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_04_06_12_FLSA.pdf 
[hereinafter April 6, 2006, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter] (describing the test for whether an unpaid participant in 
a scholastic externship program is an employee of the sponsoring entity under the FLSA); Fact Sheet #71: 
Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Standards Admin., Wage and 
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from satisfaction in assisting students’ career development, is the potential opportunity to screen 
future interns or employees. The externs are not guaranteed future internships or employment from 
their participation in the program.
66
 
In its reply letter, the Division, citing Portland Terminal Co.,
67
 opined that if all of the following 
factors are present, “a trainee, intern, extern, apprentice, graduate student, or similar individual” is 
not an employee of a sponsoring organization under the FLSA:  
1.  The training is similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic educational 
instruction;   
 
2.  The training is for the benefit of the trainees or students;   
 
3.  The trainees or students do not displace regular employees, but work under their close 
observation;  
 
4.  The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of 
the trainees or students, and on occasion the employer’s operations may actually be impeded;   
 
5.  The trainees or students are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training 
period; and  
 
6.  The employer and the trainees or students understand that the trainees or students are not 
entitled to wages for the time spent in training.
68
 
The Division concluded that under the facts presented, the externs were not employees of 
the sponsoring organization because all of its six factors were present in the externship program.
69
 
Proceeding to apply the list of factors to the organization’s operations, the Division explained: 
The training the externs receive is a practical application of material taught in a classroom; 
therefore, it qualifies as training similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic 
educational instruction. The training primarily benefits the students because the students 
participate in the program to observe the practical application of the classroom instruction in the 
workplace, thus fulfilling the second requirement. The students’ participation for only one week, 
the virtual absence of actual work, and the sponsor’s need to assign a shadowed employee means 
the sponsor does not receive any tangible benefit and may in fact lose productive work from the 
employee assigned to the student, satisfying the fourth requirement. Because the externs “shadow” 
an employee, they do not displace any regular employees. Finally, the students are clearly told that 




 The letter reiterates the Portland Terminal Co. Court’s proclamation that the expansive “definition [of 
“employee” under the Act] ‘was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any 
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another.’” Id. 
(quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)). 
68
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they will not receive a job at the conclusion of the externship and that they will not receive 
compensation for the week.
70
  
Thus, wrote the Division, the externs are not employees under the Act, and therefore are not 
entitled to the Act’s guarantee of a minimum wage.
71
 In so concluding, the Division stressed that 
“[t]his opinion is based exclusively on the facts and circumstances described in your request,” and 
added that the “[e]xistence of any other factual or historical background not contained in your 
letter might require a conclusion different from the one expressed herein.”
72
 This warning is not 
merely a boilerplate disclaimer attached to the bottom of an opinion letter; rather, it reflects the 
centrality of the economic reality test to the entire holistic inquiry of employee status under the 
Act. The heavily factual and circumstantial nature of the test means that sponsoring organizations 
that employ unpaid interns and externs must carefully examine their own operations and cannot 
simply rely upon a blanket assumption that unpaid participants in a university externship program 
are not statutory employees as a general proposition.  
The April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter draws its reasoning directly from 
Portland Terminal Co., which created a narrow exemption from the FLSA’s minimum wage 
mandate strictly for the purpose of vocational, “on the job” training solely for the benefit of the 
trainee. Thus, the Letter’s factors for FLSA minimum wage exemption for trainees focus heavily 
upon the vocational training and educational aspects of the programs that it discusses. Because of 
the Act’s uniquely broad ambit of coverage and the historically remedial purposes for which it 
was enacted, courts should continue to construe any exemptions to the Act’s coverage narrowly to 
discourage employers from improperly taking advantage of unpaid student labor. While the 
Division’s April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter opined only about participants in a 









university externship program or in a vocational training program, the Division has also issued 
guidance about the employee status of unpaid interns who work for private-sector, “for profit” 
organizations independent of a university externship program.  
The Division’s Fact Sheet #71,
73
 distributed in April 2010, provides crucial guidance 
about the employee status of unpaid interns for private, “for profit” entities. As in the April 6, 
2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, the Division opines both (1) that the determination of 
employee status is emphatically a function of facts and circumstances and (2) that, under certain 
circumstances, such unpaid interns will not be considered employees under the Act.
74
 In the Fact 
Sheet, the Division articulates a version of the six factors for employee status that subtly but 
notably differs from the Wage and Hour Opinion Letter’s version: 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is 
similar to training which would be given in an educational environment;  
 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;   
 
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close supervision of existing 
staff;  
 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of 
the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;   
 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and   
 




Unsurprisingly, the factors described in Fact Sheet #71 are remarkably similar to those 
promulgated in the April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter because both closely track the 
Court’s decision in Portland Terminal Co.. Notably, however, Fact Sheet #71 differs from the 
April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter because it stresses the first and fourth–educational 
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similarity between the internship and a bona fide educational environment and the requirement 
that an employer derive no immediate benefit from an intern’s work. The Fact Sheet clarifies that 
if the interns are engaged in the operations of the employer or are performing productive work (for 
example, filing, performing other clerical work, or assisting customers), then the fact that they 
may be receiving some benefits in the form of a new skill or improved work habits will not 
exclude them from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements because the employer 
benefits from the interns’ work.
76 
This clarification underscores the troubling reality of unpaid internships with private employers–
that many unpaid interns routinely perform productive work that directly benefits their employers. 
While the characterization of the work of unpaid interns and externs as substantially productive 
and directly beneficial to employers is of course debatable, we should more carefully interrogate 
the reality of the widespread, normative use of entirely unpaid labor. Certainly there is significant 
variation in the quality and quantity of work performed by unpaid interns and externs, but the 
FLSA demands (1) that workers be paid a minimum wage by default, (2) that any exceptions be 
narrowly construed and individually evaluated with an eye to the remedial purposes of the 
minimum wage requirement, and (3) that quality or speed of work is not a factor in determining 
entitlement to minimum wage, so there is no defense that an inexperienced novice took too many 
hours or generated amateurish work product. 
The following Part describes the extraordinarily broad ambit of liability under the FLSA, 
which includes both joint liability for joint employers and individual liability for individual actors 
who qualify as employers. Additionally, the Act may impose joint liability for third-party 
employers who are directly responsible for the violations of other employers. Additionally, the 
next Part argues that (1) universities often will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and 
externs, and therefore would be jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages; (2) even if universities 
are not joint employers under the FLSA, they may be jointly liable as third-party employers who 





directly cause minimum wage violations; and (3) a broad class of individuals, including university 
administrators and private-sector internship supervisors, may be individually liable for any unpaid 
minimum wages. 
II.  SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS, UNIVERSITIES, AND INDIVIDUAL EXTERNSHIP PROGRAM 
ADMINISTRATORS ARE JOINT EMPLOYERS WHO ARE JOINTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY 
LIABLE FOR UNPAID MINIMUM WAGES 
The previous Section established the uniquely broad ambit of working relationships 
covered by the FLSA. Whether any particular worker is an “employee” under the Act, and 
therefore is entitled to a minimum wage for her work, is a facts and circumstances inquiry 
governed by the economic reality test. In short, if the economic reality of a working relationship 
is that the worker is working under the employer’s supervision for the benefit of the employer, 
then that worker is a statutory employee. Although the FLSA makes exemptions for certain types 
of employees, and the Department of Labor has issued guidance that certain classes of workers 
are not employees if working primarily for their own benefit, these exemptions are narrow, and 
the vast majority of working relationships will be covered by the Act. 
This Part describes the extraordinarily long reach of liability for damages under the Act. 
Liability for unpaid minimum wages under the Act extends to any “employer” of an employee. 
Like its definition of “employee,” discussed in the previous Part, the Act’s definition of 
“employer” is uniquely broad, and the label potentially extends to a broad range of actors 
primarily because of two mechanisms. First, the FLSA imposes joint liability for unpaid wages 
upon joint employers of an employee. Because the Act imposes liability for unpaid minimum 
wages upon any employer of an employee, liability for those damages can simultaneously extend 
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to multiple culpable entities. Second, individual actors can qualify as employers under the Act, 
and therefore the Act imposes individual liability upon guilty individuals as well as other entities. 
This Part first explains the mechanisms for joint liability for joint employers under the Act. 
Second, this Part argues that liability may extend to third-party employers who directly cause a 
violation of the FLSA, even if there is no direct or joint employer-employee relationship between 
that employer and the aggrieved employee. Third, this Part explains that contrary to normal 
notions of limited liability under the corporate structure, liability for unpaid wages extends to 
individual persons who qualify as an “employer” by exercising significant control over employees, 
regardless of whether the entity is a corporation or not. Fourth, this Part argues that, under the 
FLSA, many universities will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs that they 
sponsor, and therefore that liability for the unpaid minimum wages of law student externs will 
often extend to sponsoring schools in addition to the sponsoring organizations that directly 
employ interns and externs. Fifth, this Part argues that, even if universities are not joint employers 
under the Act, liability for unpaid wages will often extend to them nonetheless as third-party 
employers who directly cause violations of the FLSA. Finally, this Part argues that university 
administrators who administer externship programs and internship supervisors are “employers” 
under the Act in their individual capacities, and therefore that they should be, and often will be, 
individually liable for unpaid wages due to interns and externs. 
A. FLSA Imposes Joint Liability for Unpaid Wage Violations upon Joint Employers 
The FLSA imposes liability for unpaid minimum wages upon any “employer” of an 
employee.
77
 The Act defines the term broadly to include “any person acting directly or indirectly 
in the interest of an employer in relation to the employee.”
78
 Moreover, as the next Section 
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discusses in more detail, the Act further defines “person” to include any “individual,”
79
 creating 
liability for damages for individual natural persons as well as for legal persons. The broad 
definition of “employer” means that multiple employers can be liable for the same unpaid 
minimum wage damages if the employee is employed by both at the same time. Whether a joint 
employment relationship exists among two or more employers and an employee depends on the 
facts of each case and is a function of the employee’s working relationship with each employer.
80
 
This Section describes Department of Labor regulations and the leading judicial standard, 
expressed in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.,
81
 for determining whether a joint employment 
relationship exists under the Act. 
The Department of Labor has helped clarify the circumstances that give rise to a joint 
employment relationship by issuing a set of binding regulations called “Joint Employment 
Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1979.”
82
 These regulations set the 
responsibilities of joint employers for payment of minimum wages under the Act, and declare that 
“if the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly by two or more employers, . . . all of 
the employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is considered as one 
employment for purposes of the Act.”
83
 Under these regulations, all joint employers are 
“responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of 
the [A]ct. . . .”
84
 Having established general joint and several liability between joint employers for 
any violations of the Act, the regulations proceed to identify three more specific situations where 
a joint employment relationship will exist: 
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Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or 
works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment 
relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: 
 
(1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee’s services, as, for 
example, to interchange employees; or 
 
(2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or 
employers) in relation to the employee; or 
 
(3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a 
particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by 




Although these regulations described above carry the force of law, few court decisions have relied 
upon them to reach a decision about joint employment under the FLSA.
86
 
Rather, courts apply a substantially similar multi-factor test, somewhat akin to the 
economic reality test, to determine whether a joint employment relationship exists among an 
employee and multiple employers. For decades courts applied a four-factor test initially 
developed by the Ninth Circuit in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency.
87
 However, in 
2003 the Second Circuit, calling the Bonnette four-part test “unduly narrow” and holding that it 
could not be reconciled with the uniquely expansive definition of “employee” under the FLSA, 
developed a new, more expansive six-part test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.
88
 The Zheng test 
for joint employment draws from the reasoning of Rutherford Food Corp., and considers the 
following factors: (1) whether the putative joint employer’s premises and equipment are used for 
the employee’s work; (2) whether the subcontractor (or the employee’s primary employer, 
generally) has a business that can or does shift from one other employer to another; (3) the extent 
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to which the workers perform a line job integral to the joint entity’s process of production; (4) 
whether responsibility under the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without 
material changes; (5) the degree to which the putative joint employer supervises the employee’s 
work; and (6) whether the workers work “exclusively or predominantly” for the putative joint 
employer.
89
 Additionally, the test urges district courts to “consider any other factors it deems 
relevant to its assessment of the economic realities” of the working relationship.
90
 
In Zheng, the plaintiffs were a group of garment workers directly employed by a small 
contractor.
91
 A much larger garment manufacturer had hired the contractor to work on its garment 
manufacturing line, and the workers worked in the manufacturer’s own factory.
92
 Additionally, 
their work was integral to the business operation of the manufacturer, and they worked under the 
close supervision of the manufacturer’s inspectors.
93
 The workers sued the manufacturer for 
FLSA violations, claiming that it was a joint employer under the Act.
94
 Applying the Bonnette 
factors,
95
 a district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, holding that no joint 
employment relationship existed.
96
 The Second Circuit reversed and rejected the Bonnette test, 
holding that the manufacturer was a joint employer under the economic reality of the working 
relationship, and created the Zheng test. Because the Zheng court was considering joint 
employment in the context of garment workers who worked as subcontractors for a manufacturing 
company, certain of its factors speak in manufacturing terms, but the precedent, and its broad list 
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of factors, applies in any employment context. The scope of liability for joint employers is 
notably broad under Zheng, and employers may be exposed to liability as joint employers through 
a wide variety of working relationships. However, liability for an employee’s unpaid minimum 
wages can likely also extend even to an employer who neither directly employs that employee nor 
qualifies as a joint employer under Zheng, but rather simply causes another employer’s violation. 
B. Joint Liability May Also Extend to a Third-party Employer Who Directly Causes 
Another Employer’s FLSA Violation 
The scope of liability for joint employers under the FLSA is broad. However, the scope of 
liability may be considerably broader yet, extending to employers who, although they do not 
directly employ an employee or qualify as a joint employer under the Zheng test, are an employer 
who directly causes a violation. The court in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson
97
 held that in the 
Title VII context, an employer can be liable for a violation if it directly causes the violation, even 
if that employer does not directly or jointly employ the aggrieved employee. This Section argues 
that Sibley’s broad conception of the scope of employer liability under Title VII should also apply 
in the FLSA context to properly effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act and to prevent 
employers from circumventing employee rights to be paid a minimum wage. 
In Sibley, the plaintiff was a male nurse who worked directly for his patients.
98
 A 
nonprofit hospital helped match nurses to their employer patients but did not directly employ the 
nurses.
99
 The nurse sued the hospital that coordinated his patient assignments, alleging that the 
hospital had violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination over a period of thirty-four 
years by assigning him only to male patients while female nurses routinely worked for both male 
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 The hospital moved for summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, 
arguing that it could not be liable for discrimination against the nurse under Title VII because it 
was not his employer, and that Title VII liability can only accrue between an employer and an 
employee who have a direct employment relationship.
101
 The district court entered summary 
judgment for the nurse because the hospital had not denied any of the nurse’s allegations, but 
rather had argued solely that it was not his employer.
102
 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that Title VII liability is 
not limited solely to employers that have a direct employer-employee relationship to an employee, 
holding instead that damages “may be available, in an appropriate case, against respondents who 
are neither actual nor potential direct employers of particular complainants.”
103
 Acknowledging 
that the nurse and the hospital did not have any direct employment relationship in a traditional 
sense, the court nonetheless found dispositive that the hospital did “control the premises upon 
which [the nurse’s] services were to be rendered, including [his] access to the patient for purposes 
of the initiation of such employment.”
104
 By discriminatorily intervening between the nurse and 
his patient employer, the hospital had exposed itself to Title VII liability.
105
 
The Sibley court’s extension of Title VII liability to an employer that did not have a direct 
employment relationship with the complainant was based primarily upon Title VII’s declaration 
that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against 
any individual.”
106
 The court decided that Title VII’s grant of a cause of action to “any individual” 
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rather than to “any employee” meant that the statute did not contemplate that liability could only 
accrue if an employer discriminated against an individual whom it directly or prospectively 
employed.
107
 Rather, liability accrues if the person effectuating the discriminatory act is an 
employer.
108
 Additionally, the court examined the policy of Title VII to prevent and remedy 
employment discrimination, and concluded that “neither the spirit nor, more essentially, the 
language of the Act leave . . . outside the reach of Title VII” liability for a third party 
discriminator that is an employer but not the direct employer of the aggrieved party.
109
 In doing 
so, the court prioritized the remedial policy and the anti-discriminatory substance of the Act over 
a narrow, mechanistic reading that would have limited the vigor of Title VII. 
Courts should extend Sibley’s reasoning to the FLSA context and allow plaintiffs to 
recover against third-party employers who cause minimum wage violations even in the absence of 
a direct or joint employer-employee relationship. If the Sibley court had held that only direct 
employers can be liable for a Title VII violation against an employee, it would have encouraged 
employers to limit their Title VII liability by setting up complicated structures that channel claims 
of violations to other actors. Such is also the case in the FLSA context; at the very least, extension 
of Sibley liability to third-party employers who cause a violation would discourage career 
placement services, law school career development offices, and like entities from knowingly 
encouraging FLSA violations by placing job seekers in sub-minimum-wage unpaid jobs. 
One problem with the argument that Sibley liability should extend to the FLSA context is 
that the wording of the FLSA may not allow it. While the Sibley court found especially 
dispositive that the text of Title VII forbids “an employer” from discriminating against “any 
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 the text of the FLSA minimum wage section, 29 U.S.C. § 206, commands that 
“[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees . . . not less than the minimum wage.”
111
 
However, the text of the FLSA “penalties” section arguably extends civil liability to “any 
employer” that “violates” the rights of any “employees affected” by declaring that “[a]ny 
employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to 
the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages.”
112
 
Interpretation of this arguably ambiguous language may be informed by the broader point that the 
Sibley court’s reasoning carries over entirely intact. Like the text of Title VII at issue in Sibley, 
which creates liability for “an employer” who causes a violation of Title VII, the text of the FLSA 
certainly allows for the inference that it should apply to “[e]very employer” who causes a 
minimum wage or overtime violation to occur, regardless of whether it directly or jointly employs 
the aggrieved party.  
Remember that the FLSA defines “employer” broadly as “any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”
113
 Under the reasoning of 
Sibley, a third-party who does not have a direct or joint employer-employee relationship with an 
employee should still qualify as “an employer” under the FLSA because it is “acting . . . 
indirectly in the interest of an employer”
114
 by facilitating a minimum wage violation. While Part 
II.E., infra, argues that universities should be liable for the unpaid minimum wages of their 
student interns and externs under Sibley, the next Section describes the individual liability the 
FLSA assigns to individual persons who exercise sufficient control over employees. 
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C. FLSA Imposes Individual Liability for Unpaid Wage Violations upon Individuals 
Who Exercise Sufficient Control Over Employees 
As discussed above, the FLSA defines “employer” broadly to include “any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”
115
 “Person” is also 
defined notably broadly to include, inter alia, “an individual.”
116
 Thus, any individual can be 
subject to individual liability for a minimum wage violation if he qualifies as an “employer” by 
acting in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. The primary consideration 
whether an individual will be subject to individual liability under the FLSA is whether the 
individual has exerted sufficient control over significant aspects of the employer’s employment 
practices, particularly pay.
117
 In any case, the standard for imposing individual liability under the 
FLSA is considerably lower than the veil-piercing requirements required by traditional corporate 
law.
118
 Generally speaking, courts have found employer status for an individual when the 
individual has managerial responsibilities and exercises significant control over the terms and 
conditions of an employee’s employment.
119
 Additionally, an individual will qualify as an 
employer if that individual has supervisory authority over an employee, is partially or wholly 
responsible for the violation, or has control over the employer’s compliance with the FLSA.
120
 
As with all other inquiries of employer and employee status under the FLSA, whether an 
individual qualifies as an employer, and therefore is subject to individual liability, is a matter of 
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facts and circumstances governed by the economic reality of the situation. The following Sections 
argue that (1) universities often will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs that 
they sponsor and therefore should be held jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages under the Act; 
(2) even if universities are not joint employers under the Act, they should be held liable as third-
party employers who cause FLSA violations under Sibley; and (3) university administrators and 
externship supervisors often will individually qualify as employers because they exercise 
significant control over the terms and conditions of the employment of interns and externs.  
D. Sponsoring Organizations and Universities Are Joint Employers of Interns and 
Externs and Are Jointly Liable for Unpaid Minimum Wages 
Universities will often qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs under the 
Zheng test because they are FLSA-covered employers who (1) significantly benefit from the work 
of unpaid interns and externs, (2) exercise significant control over the terms and conditions of an 
unpaid intern or extern’s employment relationship, (3) and furnish the facilities and resources 
necessary for the completion of internship work. Universities are FLSA-covered entities per se so 
long as they have at least two employees,
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 so generally they do not need to satisfy any other 
jurisdictional prerequisites to fall under FLSA coverage. Although student interns and externs are 
not employees of the universities they attend in a conventional sense, universities should qualify 
as joint employers, and therefore be subject to joint liability for unpaid minimum wages, because 
they benefit significantly from the unpaid working arrangement with sponsoring organizations 
and because they exercise a significant amount of control over almost every aspect of the terms 
and conditions of the employment of interns and externs, including, and especially, the decision to 
pay the interns no wage. 
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Universities significantly benefit from the unpaid work of participants in externship 
programs primarily because the operation of an externship program helps to dramatically reduce 
the university’s operating costs. The traditional educational model for a university is that students 
take classes taught by professors in exchange for school credit. Each professor is paid either a 
yearly salary or a per-credit salary based on the number of credits she teaches, and, generally 
speaking, each professor is expected to teach some classes each semester. Therefore, ordinarily 
the amount of tuition each student pays is directly correlated to the school’s costs of operation via 
its faculty salaries – students are expected to take, say, ninety credits over the course of their 
education, and the school must pay professors to teach ninety credits per student. Thus is the 
traditional model of university education. 
However, a school’s decision to offer credits in exchange for participation in an externship 
program can dramatically reduce a school’s operating costs. Imagine a university that requires it 
students to earn ninety credits to graduate. If half of the university’s students receive six credits 
through an externship program over the course of their time at the school, the school can offer 87 
rather than 90 credits of classes to each student without increasing its average class size. 
Assuming that each credit costs a university the same amount to offer, offering three fewer credits 
out of a catalogue of ninety allows a school to save 3.3 percent of its faculty budget. 
Universities also exercise significant control over the terms and conditions of student 
unpaid externships, primarily because they can refuse to approve the award of credits to 
participants in the programs. Many externship programs require participants to have their jobs 
pre-approved, and participants must explain the substance of the work they will be performing in 
varying levels of detail depending on the university. Furthermore, many schools require 
externship program participants to file hour logs and periodically write check-in assignments 
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throughout the length of their externships. Because a university can deny credits to externship 
participants if it is not satisfied with any of the terms and conditions of the student’s externship–
i.e. the number of hours worked or the substantive character of the work performed–universities 
should qualify as joint employers under Zheng. 
Finally, universities should qualify as joint employers because they furnish many of the 
facilities and resources necessary for an extern’s completion of his unpaid work. For example, in 
the context of law school externship programs, many externs continue to use their access to the 
Westlaw and LexisNexis research databases, provided by the school ostensibly for academic 
purposes, throughout their externships and for the benefit of their employers. Some authors have 
suggested that many private sector law firms hire unpaid interns solely for the free access to legal 
research databases that students bring with them.
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 Additionally, universities offer their library 
resources, the expertise of library staff, and library space itself for the unfettered use of students, 
many of whom certainly use these resources and facilities to help them complete externship work. 
Because many universities benefit significantly and materially from the unpaid work of 
their student interns and externs, exercise substantial control over the terms and conditions of the 
work of those interns and externs, and furnish resources and facilities necessary for the 
completion of externship work, they should be considered joint employers under Zheng, and 
therefore jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages. The next Section argues that even if 
universities are not joint employers under Zheng, many should be jointly liable regardless under 
Sibley as third-party employers who proximately cause FLSA violations. 
                                                          
122
 See, e.g., James B. Levy, Utah opinion notes “numerous” law students report employment is conditioned upon 





E. Many Universities May be Liable for Unpaid Minimum Wages under Sibley 
Because They Are “An Employer” Who Directly Caused an FLSA Violation 
The previous Section argued that many universities are jointly liable for the unpaid 
minimum wages of their students who participate in externship programs because they are joint 
employers under Zheng. However, even if universities do not qualify as joint employers under 
Zheng, many of them should be jointly liable nonetheless under Sibley’s extension of liability to 
third-party employers who proximately cause a violation. Although Sibley was a Title VII case, 
Part II.B argued that it should also apply in the FLSA context both because the text of the FLSA 
allows it and because such an application would effectuate the remedial policy of the Act. 
Universities that administer externships that do not qualify for FLSA exemption would be liable 
under Sibley because they are FLSA-covered employers who, although not in a direct or joint 
employer-employee relationship with their student externs, directly cause FLSA minimum wage 
violations by acting as the sole intermediary between unpaid externs and their sponsoring entities, 
thereby directly facilitating minimum wage violations. 
Universities that administer unpaid externships that violate the minimum wage 
requirement are in a remarkably similar position to the defendant hospital in Sibley. In that case, 
the hospital was not the plaintiff nurse’s direct employer, but the court found it enough to impose 
liability upon the hospital that it did “control the premises upon which [the nurse’s] services were 
to be rendered, including [his] access to the patient for purposes of the initiation of such 
employment.”
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 Like the hospital in that case, universities have absolute control over student 
access to the externship employers for whom they work. Without university-administered 
externship programs, for-credit unpaid externship jobs would not exist at all. In a very real sense, 
universities absolutely control externs’ access to their employers for initiation of their 
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employment. Universities do not typically have absolute control over the premises upon which 
unpaid externs render their services. However, as the previous Section argued, it is likely that 
externs perform a significant portion of their work on school premises and using school resources. 
Universities may, and should, be jointly liable for the unpaid minimum wages of any 
externship program participants who qualify as “employees” under the FLSA, both as joint 
employers under Zheng and as third-party employers who directly cause an FLSA violation under 
Sibley. Moreover, because the FLSA imposes individual liability upon any individuals who also 
qualify as an “employer” under the FLSA, a significant number of people may also be 
individually liable, including university administrators and extern supervisors. 
F. Many University Externship Program Administrators and Other Individuals Should 
Be Individually Liable for the Unpaid Minimum Wages of Interns and Externs 
Because the FLSA imposes individual liability upon any individual who qualifies as an 
employer, broadly defined as any person who acts in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee, the class of people potentially individually liable for unpaid minimum wages of interns 
and externs is large. Generally speaking, individuals will be subject to individual liability if they 
exert significant control over an employer’s employment practices, particularly pay; if they 
exercise managerial authority over employees; if they are personally responsible for the violation; 
or if they are responsible for the employer’s general compliance with the FLSA. In the context of 
unpaid interns and externs who work for private-sector employers, two classes of people may be 
subject to individual liability: (1) university officials who administer illegal externship programs 
and other school officials significantly involved in the decision to sponsor illegally unpaid 
internships and externships, and (2) individuals responsible for hiring and supervising unpaid 
interns and externs at their sponsoring employers. 
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University officials who administer externship programs that place interns and externs in 
illegally unpaid jobs may be subject to individual liability under the FLSA because they exercise 
managerial authority over externs and they are significantly responsible for the university’s 
continued FLSA violations. In many externship programs, such administrators exercise 
managerial authority over externs by having the ultimate discretion whether to award school 
credit. Additionally, externship program administrators have significant managerial authority over 
the terms and conditions of an extern’s employment such that they act as de facto supervisors. For 
example, in many externship programs administrators must approve the number of hours an 
extern will work, who will supervise the extern, and exactly what types of work the extern will be 
doing before she can even begin the externship. Such involvement in the terms and conditions of 
the extern’s employment, coupled with the administrator’s ultimate authority to decide whether 
the extern will receive credit, means that externship program administrators may be individually 
liable for any illegal unpaid externships that they oversee. 
In addition to university officials who actively administer externship programs, school 
administrative officials who approve the existence and maintenance of illegal externship 
programs, such as law school deans, may also be subject to individual liability under the Act. 
High-ranking university officials are partially responsible for university FLSA compliance, and 
their decisions to maintain the existence of such programs directly affect the pay (or lack thereof) 
of many student participants. Like CEOs and company presidents who have been held 
individually liable for widespread FLSA violations at their companies, higher-ranking university 
administrators may be subject to individual liability for widespread violations at their universities. 
Finally, supervisors of illegally unpaid interns and externs may be held individually liable 
for FLSA violations if they are significantly involved in hiring and the decision to pay zero wages 
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to interns and externs. Such supervisors are likely to have significant authority over the 
substantive terms and conditions of an extern’s employment. Moreover, supervisors and those in 
charge of hiring are directly complacent in violations by being personally involved in the day to 
day work of unpaid employees. Of course, like the holistic inquiry of employer status under the 
FLSA, whether any particular individual will be held individually liable is a function of facts and 
circumstances, but any individual who falls within the FLSA’s uniquely broad definition of 
“employer” will be individually liable for damages if the unpaid internship or externship does 
violate the FLSA. 
CONCLUSION 
Unpaid internships and externships are a commonplace–almost ubiquitous–experience for 
many university students and younger workers. Opinions about the morality, usefulness, and 
educational value of such unpaid jobs vary considerably, but the legality of such unpaid jobs is far 
from clear. This Article has argued that many unpaid internships and externships for private 
employers actually violate the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 
Universities that sponsor externship programs and private-sector employers that hire unpaid 
interns and externs should carefully evaluate the unpaid jobs that they offer, lest they be exposed 
to potentially considerable liability for unpaid minimum wages. 
This Article has further argued that universities that administer externship programs may 
be, and should be, jointly liable for any damages due to unpaid interns and externs that they 
sponsor, both as joint employers and as third-party employers that directly cause and facilitate 
FLSA violations. Furthermore, a broad class of individuals may be individually liable for the 
illegally unpaid minimum wages of interns and externs. Some such individuals include university 
administrators, particularly externship programs administrators and deans, and individuals who 
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supervise and hire unpaid interns at their private-sector jobs. The goal of this Article is to 
encourage employers to pay interns and externs a fair wage for their work. Additionally, this 
Article encourages universities to more carefully examine the educational value–and morality–of 
the unpaid internships and externships that they sponsor, so that they can ensure that students who 
work for no wages will have a genuinely edifying, educational experience rather than simply 
serve as a source of free labor. 
